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Waking the Neighbors: Determining a Landowner's
Liability for Rowdy Tenants Under Louisiana Law

I. INTRODUCTION

It is a typical night on Bourbon Street. Beer, beads, and bedlam
fill the French Quarter. Miles away from the action, the owner of
one Bourbon Street establishment sleeps quietly in his home. Little
does he know that he may be incurring liability for the raucous
behavior of his tenant who runs a rowdy French Quarter bar.
In Yokum v. 615 Bourbon Street, a unanimous Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that a landowner-lessor may be liable
for the damage caused by his tenant-lessee under Louisiana Civil
Code article 667.1 The tenant in Yokum managed a bar on Bourbon
Street, and his neighbors filed suit against the landowner for
damages and injunctive relief for the alleged excessive noise
emanating from the property. 2 The court held that landowners can
be held liable for damage caused to their neighbors when the
landowners' tenant is responsible for the nuisance-creating
activity, provided the owner knew or should have known that the
activity would cause harm.3 This decision noticeably shifted the
law in Louisiana and could significantly impact landowner-tenant
relationships and the future of lease agreements in Louisiana.4
In addition to addressing issues of liability surrounding the
landowner-tenant relationship, the Yokum court also tackled a
confused area of Louisiana law regarding liability for nuisances. In
the past, some Louisiana courts have used common law nuisance
principles to impose liability on defendants and justify injunctions
against certain conduct.5 Other courts have analyzed such cases
under a purely property law-oriented approach using the articles
Copyright 2010, by GINA PALERMO.

1. 977 So. 2d 859 (La. 2008).
2. Id at 862.
3. Id at 876.
4. See Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 960 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 2007), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 859 (La. 2008); King v. Western Club, Inc., 587
So. 2d 122 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Pinello v. Reed, 559 So. 2d 988 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1990); Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971).
5. Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971); Kuhl v. St.
Bernard Rendering & Fertilizing Co., 41 So. 361 (La. 1906); Muller v. Stone, 27
La. Ann. 123 (La. 1875); Arrington v. Hearin Tank Lines, Inc., 80 So. 2d 167
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); see also Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,
Burying Caesar:Civil Justice Reform and the ChangingFace of Louisiana Tort

Law, 71 TuL. L. REv. 339, 363 (1996).
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667-669, which govern predial servitudes, 6 while still others have
analogized these articles to, or used them in combination with, the
tort principles of article 2315. 7 In 1996, the Louisiana Legislature
dramatically changed Louisiana tort law, in part by amending
several articles to eliminate strict liability and create a more faultbased system. 8 The legislature revised article 667 as part of this
reform, instillinF a negligence standard for liability of a landowner
into article 667.
If the Louisiana Supreme Court is to maintain Louisiana's
fault-based approach consistent with the 1996 tort reform, then the
interpretation of article 667 in Yokum was overbroad; instead, this
Comment argues that article 667 should only apply to the owner of
the land if the owner is actually responsible for the existence of the
nuisance-causing activity. To reach this end, Part II analyzes both
United States common law and Louisiana interpretations of
nuisance and their approaches to landowner-tenant liability when
such nuisances occur on leased premises. Part III introduces the
Yokum case, which is Louisiana's most recent interpretation of
article 667 with respect to nuisance. Part III also highlights the
potential problems with the Yokum decision and addresses how
courts should approach the issue in the future. In doing so, Part III
analyzes the Louisiana Civil Code, Louisiana jurisprudence, and
doctrine, while comparing Louisiana's approach to that of the
common law.
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS A NUISANCE AND WHO SHOULD BE
LIABLE FOR IT?

Tort legal scholars Prosser and Keeton describe nuisance as the
following:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
law than that which surrounds the word "nuisance." It has
meant all things to all people, and has been applied
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming
6. See Yokum, 977 So. 2d 859; Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So.
2d 845 (La. 1955); Devoke v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 30 So. 2d 816 (La.
1947); Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co., 196 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. See Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994); Butler v.
Baber, 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988); Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d
93 (La. 1975); Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d
905 (La. 1973); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971);
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
8. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 5, at 339.

9. Id. at 342.
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advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is a
general agreement that it0 is incapable of any exact or
comprehensive definition.'
Because Louisiana has borrowed from the common law's
interpretation of nuisance, it is appropriate to examine the
concept's development in that system.
A. United States Common Law Approach to Nuisance
Two very different lines of interpretation regarding what
constitutes a nuisance explain the confusion that Professors Prosser
and Keeton describe. One line, known as private nuisance,
narrowly defines "nuisance" as the invasion of interests in the use
or enjoyment of land." The other line, known as public nuisance,
defines the term broadly, extending to virtually any form of
annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public
rights. 12 This Comment focuses on private nuisances occurring on
leased premises.
Common law courts13 have been fairly uniform in defining
"private nuisance" as an unreasonable activity or condition on the
defendant's land that substantially or unreasonably interferes with
the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land. 14 The interference
can be (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and
otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for
negligence, reckless conduct, or abnormally dangerous conditions
or activities.' 5 Although "nuisance," in its broadest sense, is
defined as the "equivalence to a dangerous condition which may
cause harm, inconvenience, or damage to another,"' 16 typical
10. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Mandell v.Pivnick, 125 A.2d 175 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1956)
(describing the distinction between conceptions of public and private nuisance).
13. For the purposes of this Comment, "common law" refers to United
States common law.
14.

WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §

7.2 (3d ed. 2000); see also County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996); Louisville Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky.
1960); Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (N.Y. App. Div.
1932); Morin v. Johnson, 300 P.2d 569 (Wash. 1956).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
16. Lucas v. Brown, 82 F.2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1936); see also Cornwell
v. Maruca, 32 Va. Cir. 116, 117 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993) ("A nuisance includes
'everything that endangers life or health or obstructs the reasonable and
comfortable use of property."' (quoting Barnes v. Graham Va. Quarries, Inc.,
132 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1963))).
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private nuisance agerits are noise, dust, smoke, odors, other
airborne or
17 waterborne contaminants, vermin, insects, and
vibrations.
Most nuisance cases involve an attempt by a plaintiff to obtain
an injunction or damages for harm done by a neighboring
landowner, 18 Sometimes, however, like in Yokum, the person
creating the nuisance is not the landowner, but instead is a tenant
of the property. When a tenant's actions cause harm to a third
party, most American jurisdictions adhere to the "traditional view"
of landowner-tenant liability.' 9 This view holds that the landowner
is generally not liable, with some exceptions. 20 Under this view,
the owner is under no obligation to look after the leased premises
or keep it in repair; nor is he responsible for persons injured on the
premises or for conditions that develop during the tenant's
occupancy. 21 Similarly, he is not responsible for the tenant's
activities upon the land after the transfer, even when those
activities create a nuisance. 22
This traditional view flows in large part from two fundamental
principles of landowner-tenant law. The first is the doctrine of
caveat emptor.2 3 Under this rule, the buyer (or in this case the
tenant) purchases at his peril24 and is subject to any defects or
encumbrances on the land that he could have obtained knowledge
of had he made a reasonable investigation. A second fundamental
principle of property law establishes that the lease of land is
equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term of the lease. 26 The
17. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 7.2.
18. See, e.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142 (Mass. 1963).
19. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
20. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 10, § 63; STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46; see also Tetzlaffv. Camp, 715 N.W.2d 256,
263 (Iowa 2006); Borders v. Roseberry, 532 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1975);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 17.1-.7 (1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 355-362 (1965).
21. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
22. Lucas v. Brown, 82 F.2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1936); STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
23. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
24. Id.The doctrine of caveat emptor refers to a maxim of the common law,
"let the buyer beware." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (3d ed. 1969).
25. 50A C.J.S. JudicialSales § 61 (2008).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 356 cmt. a;
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46; see also Klimkowski v. De La
Torre, 857 P.2d 392, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) ("A landowner ...generally is
not responsible for a tenant's acts in creating or maintaining a nuisance upon the
leasehold after the landlord transfers possession to the tenant. This rule rests
upon the principle that property law regards a lease as equivalent to a sale of the
premises for the term of the lease, making the tenant both owner and occupier
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tenant acquires an estate in the land for the duration of the lease
and becomes the possessor, subject to all responsibilities of one in
possession for what occurs on the land.27 The owner surrenders
both possession and control of the land and retains only a
reversionary interest, such that the owner has no right to enter
without permission of the tenant. 28 As a result, under the traditional
view, it is a substantial burden to impose liability on a landowner
29
when he had no right of entry or power to abate the nuisance.
There are multiple exceptions to the traditional rule under
which the landowner may be found liable for injuries caused by
conditions on the leased premises. 30 The landowner is liable to the
tenant and others for personal injuries that occur in "common
areas" when the owner fails to use reasonable care in maintaining
those areas.3 1 A landowner may also be liable if there is a
concealed or "latent" defect that exists on the property when the
lease begins and that defect is known or reasonably should be
known to the landowner. 32 An owner can also be held liable to
third persons in some jurisdictions for personal injuries that are
caused by conditions the landowner promised but failed to repair
or was negligent in repairing. 33 Finally, a landowner who leases
premises that are to be used for admission to the public may be

during the lease." (citation omitted)); Tetzlaff v. Camp, 715 N.W.2d 256, 260
(Iowa 2006) ("Property law regards a lease as equivalent to a sale of the
premises for the term of the lease, making the tenant both owner and occupier
during the lease.").
27. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 10, § 63; STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
28. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 10, § 63.
29. See, e.g., Lucas v. Brown, 82 F.2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1936); see also
Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen, 4 F.2d 85, 92 (8th Cir. 1924) ('"In such case it may
be said ... that the landlord permitted the tenant to create the nuisance, but not
in a sense as to render him liable.'... 'Merely permitting another to commit a
nuisance does not render one liable for its consequences."' (quoting Maenner v.
Carroll, 46 Md. 193, 216 (Md. 1877) and Langabaugh v. Anderson, 67 N.E. 286,
291 (Ohio 1903))).
30. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
31. Paul v. Sharpe, 352 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Borders v.
Roseberry, 532 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1975); Fipps v. Glenn Miller Constr. Co., 662
So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1995); Kennett v. Yates, 250 P.2d 962 (Wash. 1952).
32. Casey v. Estes, 657 So. 2d 845 (Ala. 1995); City of Yuma v. Evans, 336
P.2d 135 (Ariz. 1959); Borders, 532 P.2d 1366; Freitag v. Evenson, 375 P.2d 69
(Or. 1962).
33. See, e.g., Williams v. Davis, 362 P.2d 641 (Kan. 1961); Komspan v.
Hertzberg, 602 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Teglo v. Porter, 399 P.2d
519 (Wash. 1965).
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liable to members of the public who are34 injured by a defective
condition that exists at the time of leasing.
Some common law jurisdictions take a different approach and
reject the traditional view in order to find liability based upon the
ordinary negligence doctrine. For example, in 1973, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire declared in Sargent v. Ross that a
landowner is liable to the tenant or others for injuries on or about
the premises if the owner fails to exercise the general tort duty of
reasonable care in all circumstances. 36 In Sargent, a small child
who was the guest of a tenant died when she fell off of an outside
stairway leading to the tenant's apartment. 37 The child's parents
claimed that the landowner was negligent in having a stairway that
was too steep. 38 In holding for the parents, the court announced
that legal liability should henceforth be based upon the doctrine of
ordinary neqligence, not the traditional rule with the traditional
exceptions.3 The Sargent court said that questions of control,
latent defects, and common areas are only factors to be
considered. 40 Although the majority of states still adheres to the
traditional doctrine, the4 1Sargent opinion has attracted a following
in several jurisdictions.
A shift in public policy has for some years made landownertenant law more favorable to residential tenants and less favorable
to landowners, which has caused the number of exceptions to the
traditional rule to grow. 42 This shift is due in part to the fact that
the doctrine of caveat emptor is weakening. 4 Liability has also
increased for landowners due to the tide turning against the
enforceability of exculpatory clauses in residential leases, which
34. Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 240 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1952); Hamilton v.
Union Oil Co., 339 P.2d 440 (Or. 1959). Another exception to the general rule is
that a landowner can be subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity
carried on upon the land during a lease if: the landowner would be liable if he
had carried on the activity himself, and (a) at the time of the lease the landowner
consents to the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on,
and (b) he knows or should know that it will necessarily involve or is already
causing the nuisance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 15, § 837.
35. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
36. 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973).
37. Id. at 529.
38. Id. at 529-30.
39. Id. at 534.
40. Id.
41. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46; see Stephens v. Steams,
678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984); Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1980);
Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1985); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723
(Utah 1985); Pagelsdorfv. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1979).
42. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
43. Id.
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waive a landowner's legal liability for tort injury. 44 Both court
decisions and statutes have either invalidated such clauses or
restricted their operation based on public policy grounds and the
unequal bargaining power of tenants. 45 When one considers the
expansion of the exceptions to the traditional doctrine, along with
the adoption by several jurisdictions of the Sargent approach, it
becomes clear that landowner immunity from tort liability is not as
strong as it once was.4 6
B. Louisiana s Approach to Nuisance
The common law concept of "nuisance" has made its way into
Louisiana law, having a similar meaning in Louisiana as in
common law jurisdictions.4 7 The manner in which Louisiana courts
deal with liability in landowner-tenant relationships, however, is
different from the common law approach. In most cases, Louisiana
courts do not apply the traditional common law view; instead,
several Louisiana Civil Code articles govern the liability of
landowners.
1. Legislation
In Louisiana, the sources of civil responsibility of landowners
fall primarily under two broad areas of law: the rules of property
law and the law of delictual obligations.48 A landowner's duties
under property law are found in Title IV of the Louisiana Civil
Code. Articles 667, 668, and 669 establish certain limitations on
44. Id.
45. Id.; see Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996);
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982); McCutcheon v. United Homes
Corp., 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971).
46. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 6.46.
47. "Louisiana jurisprudence recognizing nuisance actions is consistent with
common law notions of nuisance." JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM CORBETr &
TOM RICHARD, TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 504

(2007); see also Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971)
("[N]oxious smells, rats, flies and noise may constitute an actionable nuisance
although produced and carried on by a lawful business, where they result in
material injury to neighboring property or interfere with its comfortable use and
enjoyment by persons of ordinary sensibilities."); Borenstein v. Joseph Fein
Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) ("Nuisance is a very
comprehensive term which is not and should not be the subject of technical
definitions or rigid rules. The law in this area should be expansive so as to
provide for fair and reasonable results under all of the circumstances of each
individual case.").
48. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Frameworkof Vicinage:
Articles 667-69 and2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REv. 195, 196 (1974).
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the scope and extent of the right of ownership in immovable
property. 49 These limitations are qualified as predial legal
servitudes.50 A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate for
the benefit of a dominant estate, wherein the owner of the servient
51
estate is obligated to abstain from doing something on his estate.
A legal servitude is a limitation imposed on owners of
52 immovable
property established by law for public policy reasons.
Louisiana courts use the vicinage articles to govern the
corresponding rights and obligations arising from the relationships
of neighboring proprietors. 53 The original version of article 667
states that "[a]lthough a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be
the cause of any damage to him." 54 Article 668 permits a
landowner to engage in works that merely cause some
inconvenience, so long as the neighbor's buildings are not
damaged by the works. Article 669 indicates that inconveniences
resulting from the emission of smoke or odors may be tolerated or
suppressed, depending on police regulations and customs.5 6 These
articles illustrate an attempt to achieve a balance between the
conflicting interests of landowners represented by two ancient
civilian maxims: neminem laedit qui suojure utitur (the exercise of
a right does not give rise to civil responsibility) and sic utere tuum
ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a manner as not
to injure that of another).57 The landowner has the right to conduct
any lawful business that is not per se a nuisance, so long as it does
not unreasonably inconvenience
a neighbor in the reasonable
58
enjoyment of his property.
The other source of civil responsibility of landowners is the
law of delictual obligations. 59 A landowner, like any other person,
may be responsible to others if he has committed a tort or an act
that gives rise to responsibility under the law of delictual
49. A.N. YIANNOPouLos, PREDIAL SERVITUDES
LAW TREATISE 95 (3d ed. 2004).

§ 33, in 4

LOUISIANA CIVIL

50. Id.
51. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 651, 666 (2008).
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 659 (2008).
53. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859, 872-73 (La. 2008)
(citing Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243, 1250-51 (La. 1994)).
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (1870) (amended 1996).
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 668 (2008).
56. LA. CIv. CODE art. 669 (2008).
57. Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 195.
58. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 803 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
59. YIA4NNoPOuLOs, supra note 49, § 26.
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obligations. 60 Article 2315 declares that "[e]very act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it." 61 This article contemplates responsibility
founded on fault (namely negligence), intentional conduct, or
abuse of right.62 This article also sets a significant limitation on the
right of ownership insofar as landowners are concerned because 63a
landowner must act as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence.
This means that if a landowner does not take the requisite
precautions in the exercise of his right of ownership, he is
responsible for the damage he causes.6 4
When it comes to the basis for determining liability for
nuisances created by owners or tenants of immovable property,
Louisiana courts have not drawn a clear line between fault based
on property rules and fault based on delictual obligations.
Jurisprudence illustrates significant overlap of the two obligations
in cases involving property owners who cause a nuisance.! This
was not always the case, as some courts have tried to distinguish
the concept of a predial servitude obligation under article 667 with
that of a delictual obligation. 66 For example, in the 1947 case of
Devoke v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RailroadCo., the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that an action under article 667 "is not one in
tort, but, rather is one that springs from an obligation imposed
upon property owners by operation of law." 67 Louisiana legal
scholar Joseph Dainow also emphasized the difference between
delictual responsibility and responsibility based on articles 667669.68 He wrote that liability for damages caused by the violation
of a servitude is part of a property relationship and not a matter of
torts. 69 However, in a number of decisions, Louisiana courts have
combined the analysis of articles 667 or 669 with article 2315 to
conclude that "the violation of the duty set out by article 667
constitutes 'fault' within the meaning of article 2 3 15 .,,70 In
60. Id.
61.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2008).

62. Yiannopoulos, supranote 48, at 197.
63. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 49, § 27.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 7.
66. See supra note 6.
67. 30 So. 2d 816, 821 (La. 1947).
68. Joseph Dainow, Property, The Works of the LouisianaAppellate Courts
for the 1965-1966 Term, 27 LA. L. REv. 438 (1967).
69. Id.at 439.
70. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d 125, 129
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); see also Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374, 379-80 (La.
1988); King v. Western Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 122, 123-24 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1991) ("Since Article 667 imposes a legal servitude upon the proprietor in favor
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multiple Louisiana cases, courts have imposed liability for fault
under article 2315 by analogy to the conduct required by articles
667-669. 7 1 For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Inabnet
v. Exxon Corp. in 1994 explained that "judicial decisions have
clarified that conduct by a proprietor violative of Articles 667-669
may give rise to delictual liability, without negligence, as a species
of fault within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
Louisiana courts have also used the vicinage articles to place
liability on landowners who cause damage to neighbors by
engaging in "ultrahazardous activity." 73 The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Langlois v. Allied Chemical held that a company was
liable for an injury caused by highly poisonous gas that had
leaked-even in the absence of negligence-because the storage of
74
the dangerous poisonous gas was an "ultrahazardous activity.
The Langlois court characterized the defendant's actions as a
violation of article 669 but explained that such a violation can also
constitute fault under article 2315. Subsequently, in Butler v.
Baber, the Louisiana Supreme Court similarly imposed absolute
liability upon a dredger who damaged plaintiffs oyster beds,
despite the fact that no "ultrahazardous activity" occurred.7 6 The
court indicated that all that is necessary to establish liability under
article 2315 is a violation of article 667, and the latter article is
violated if one uses an interest in land in a manner that causes
damage to another. 77 Again, Louisiana courts blurred the
distinction between property law and tort law by stating that a
violation of one of the vicinage articles constitutes fault under
article 2315.
Louisiana legal scholar A. N. Yiannopoulos asserts an easy
explanation as to why Louisiana courts have expressed divergent
views regarding the nature of responsibility under article 667.78
Courts hunt for a particular theory in cases in which theory is

of its neighbor, a breach of that servitude is subject to an action for damages
under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315.").
71. See Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994); Lombard v.
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905 (La. 1973); Langlois v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971); supra note 70.
72. 642 So.2d at 1251.
73. Langlois, 249 So. 2d 133.
74. Id. at 139.
75. Id. at 140.
76. 529 So.2d 374 (La. 1988).
77. Id. at 379-80.
78. Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 207-08.
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essential for the resolution of a particular controversy.79 For
example, Louisiana courts have qualified actions as "delictual" in
order to explain the application of the one-year liberative
prescription period, 80 to exclude a public body's liability under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, 8 1 or to hold responsible persons
other than landowners. 82 On the other hand, courts qualified a
particular action as a matter of property law to justify the
imposition of strict liability at a time when liability under article
2315 was thought to rest exclusively on neglijence 8 3 or to limit
application of strict liability to landowners only." 4 Thus, in the past
there were important differences in the outcome of certain cases
depending upon whether a court applied tort law or property law.
The legislative tort reform of 1996,85 however, blurred even
more the distinction between the predial servitude and the delictual
obligation owed by a landowner to neighbors. In this reform act,
the legislature extensively revised Louisiana tort law, in large part
to scale back the use of absolute and strict liability that had become
prevalent in Louisiana jurisprudence. 86 The legislature amended
tort articles 2317, 2322, 2321, and, not surprisingly, article 667,
which courts used for years to impose delictual liability on
landowners vis-A-vis article 2315.87 The amended law now
requires plaintiffs to prove negligence in most situations that
88
formerly would have given rise to strict or absolute liability.
Amended article 667 now provides:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him. However, if
the work he makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of
enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerablefor
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968);
Gullatt v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 243 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
81. See, e.g., Klein v. Dep't of Highways, 175 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965).
82. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d
125 (La. App. 4thCir. 1965), writ refused, 178 So. 2d 658 (La. 1965).
83. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845 (La.
1955); Devoke v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 30 So. 2d 816 (La. 1947).
84. See, e.g., Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co., 196 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967).
85. 1996 La. ActsNo. 1.
86. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 5, at 339.
87. Id. at 342; see supra Part II.B.1.
88. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 5, at 342.
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damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his
works would cause damage, that the damage could have
been prevented by the exercise of reasonablecare, and that
he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court from the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.
Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for damages
without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of
reasonable care, if the damage is caused by an
ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used
in this Article is89strictly limited to pile driving or blasting
with explosives.

The amended article 667 clearly articulates that the only
ultrahazardous conditions recognized in Louisiana are "pile
driving" and "blasting with explosives." 90 This shifts the basis of
liability for any other activity for damages under article 667 from a
form of absolute liability to one of negligence. 91 Interestingly,
although article 667 is a vicinage article that governs predial
servitudes, the significant substantive language regarding
knowledge-including "could have been prevented," "reasonable
care," and "res ipsa loquitur"--is the same language used in article
2317.1 and in the amendments to articles 2321 and 2322, which
are articles that govern tort law. 92 These amendments were geared
toward tort reform, but the legislature amended a property article
to achieve the goal of eliminating strict liability for certain tortious
behavior. Professor Yiannopoulos has described the amendment to
article 667 as "hasty," 93 perhaps because article 667 now reads
very similarly to the articles governing general tort duties. This
blurs the distinction between the predial servitude traditionally
owed by landowners to their neighbors and the delictual obligation
to act reasonably under all circumstances, which applies to all
citizens.
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2008) (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 5, at 364.
92. Id.; see, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 2317.1 (2008) ("The owner or
custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or
defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the
damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that
he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude
the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case.").
93. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 49, § 31.
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2. Jurisprudence
While Louisiana diverges from the common law analysis in its
statutory application of nuisance law, some Louisiana courts have
been more amenable to following the common law's
jurisprudential approach in determining liability for nuisances
occurring on leased premises, which generally holds harmless the
landowner when the tenant creates the nuisance. Early Louisiana
jurisprudence shows an interpretation very similar to that of the
common law approach, imposing liability under the vicinae 4
articles by analogizing to the common law precepts of nuisance.
For example, in Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that articles 667-669 have "been employed
by this [c]ourt together with the common-law theory of nuisance to
grant relief where a use of property causes inconvenience to a
neighbor., 9 5 In Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rendering & Fertilizing Co.,
the Louisiana Supreme Court released a landowner from liability
when his tenant's business caused a nuisance. 96 In 1955, a
Louisiana appellate court reaffirmed this position in Arrington v.
Hearin Tank Lines when it relieved a landowner of liability for
damage occurring during tank unloading operations that were
entirely in the control of another. 9 7 The court stated that "[m]ere
lawful ownership alone is not sufficient to create liability. It is the
negligent use of the property which requires the owner to respond
in damages." 98 Despite the fact that neither of these cases relied on
article 667, these decisions exemplify how Louisiana courts
support the idea that the landowner is not liable for a nuisance that
he neither created nor maintained on his land.
On the other hand, when analyzing nuisance issues under
article 667, some Louisiana courts have held that the landowner
alone can be liable for a nuisance, even when the tenant creates or
maintains it.99 This conclusion is based on the interpretation of the
term "proprietor" in article 667. According to traditional civilian
notions, tenants cannot be regarded as "proprietors" within the
literal meaning of articles 667 and 668 because the rights arising
from leases are personal rather than real; therefore, real rights are

94. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT
LAW § 16.03 (2d ed. 2004).
95. 245 So. 2d 385, 389 (La. 1971).
96. 41 So. 361 (La. 1906).
97. 80 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
98. Id. at 173.
99. Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co., 196 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967);
see also Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp 875 (W.D. La. 1967).
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conferred only on the landowner and cannot be transferred. 00 The
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Burke v. Besthoff
followed this traditional approach in a case where a tenant rented
property for the operation of a trash disposal service.' 0 ' Tenants of
the adjoining property sued the tenant and the landowner for
vibrations from the operation that caused surface cracks in
structures on their property.10 2 On appeal, the court concluded that
the tenant could not be held liable under article 667 because he was
not the proprietor or owner of the property,1 3 thereby finding
liability solely on the landowner of the property.
More recent courts have stretched the definition of "proprietor"
to include not only the owner of the property, but also those
persons holding rights derived from the landowner. 0 4 In Lombard
v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found the state municipality liable under article
667 for damage done to the plaintiffs even though the Water Board
10 5
of New Orleans was not technically the owner of the property.
The court10 6held that the term "proprietor" need not be limited to
"owner."
In 1994, the fourth circuit in Inabnet held a tenant
liable under article
' 0 7 667, citing Lombard's expansive interpretation
of "proprietor."'
In Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., the fourth circuit
took a fresh approach in defining "nuisance" and determining
liability. 108 The plaintiff, Borenstein, sued a neighboring tenant for
allegedly harboring a raised planter and a large vine that grew
along the common wall, which caused moisture that deteriorated
the base of the wall and damaged the roof.'0 9 Borenstein sued the
tenant for abatement of the nuisance and damages. 11° While the
court found that the vine and the planter were enjoinable
nuisances, it refused to find the tenant liable because the vine and
the planter were on the premises before the tenant entered the

YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 49, § 45.
101. 196 So. 2dat295.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 297-98.
104. Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243, 1251 (La. 1994).
105. 284 So. 2d 905, 914 (La. 1973).
106. Id. The court stated that "[a]ny person assuming the position of owner,
usufructuary, possessor in good or bad faith, or lessee, may qualify as proprietor
by virtue of an expansive interpretation." Id.
107. 642 So. 2d at 1251; see Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana:
The Obligations of Neighborhood,40 TUL. L. REv. 701, 711 (1966).
108. 255 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 803.
110. Id. at 802.
100.
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lease."' Instead, the court held that "[t]he nuisance is a condition,
and the person legally liable for the nuisance is 12the person actually
responsible for the existence of the condition."''
In sum, early Louisiana jurisprudence determined that a tenant
alone could be liable for creating a nuisance, 113 but conflicting
cases established that, if liability is determined under article 667,
only a landowner could be held liable as proprietor)' 14 Subsequent
to Burke, courts expanded the notion of "proprietor" in article 667
to include tenants.
Finally, in Borenstein, the court suggested
that either a landowner or a tenant can be liable under article 667,
and liability depends on which of them is responsible for the
creation and maintenance of the nuisance." 6 Questions still
remained, however, as to whether a landowner can be liable for the
nuisance activities of his tenant.'' 7
III. FILLING THE GAP: How YOKUMHAS CHANGED THE LAW

In Yokum, the Louisiana Supreme Court finally examined the
issue of liability for nuisances arising on leased premises and filled
the gap left by earlier cases." 8 Plaintiffs, the Yokums, were
neighbors to 615 Bourbon Street, the property owned by
defendants, 615 Bourbon Street, L.L.C." 9 In 2003, the owner
executed a commercial lease of the property with O'Reilly

111. Id.at804-06.
112. Id. at 806.
113. See Kuhl v. St. Bernard Rendering & Fertilizing Co., 41 So. 361 (La.
1906); Arrington v. Hearin Tank Lines, Inc., 80 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955).
114. See Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co., 196 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967); Daigle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967).
115. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905
(La. 1973); Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994).
116. Borenstein, 255 So. 2d at 806.
117. See Pinello v. Reed, 559 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). A
neighbor sued a landowner, alleging that continuous barking of the tenant's dog
constituted a nuisance. Id.at 989. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated that
Louisiana jurisprudence regarding nuisance does not specifically answer the
question of whether or not a property owner may be held liable for the activities
of his or her tenant. Id. at 990. However, instead of making a decision on the
issue, the court remanded the case for a trial on the merits. Id.; see also King v.
Western Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991). A neighbor sued
both the landowner and the tenant for loud noise that the plaintiff claimed
constituted a nuisance. Id.at 123. The trial court refused to hold the landowner
liable, and the issue was not raised on appeal. Id.
118. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859 (La. 2008).
119. Id.at861.
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Properties, who operated a bar known as The Rock. 120 Later that
year, the Yokums sent a letter to both the bar manager and to the
landowner complaining of excessive noise emanating from the bar,
which interfered with the Yokums' privacy and ability to use and
enjoy their property. 12 1 The Yokums sent a second letter in 2005 to
the bar manager only and then filed suit against the landowner
alleging that the excessive noise constituted a nuisance.12 2 Among
other claims, the Yokums asserted that the landowner was in
violation of articles 667 and 669 because the owner was a
"proprietor," had knowledge of the noise nuisance emanating from
its premises,
and took no action to cease and desist or to reduce the
12 3
noise.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 615
Bourbon Street, L.L.C., who argued that the Yokums' petition
contained no allegations whatsoever that would impose liability on
615 Bourbon Street, L.L.C., in its capacity as landowner of the
premises. 124 The fourth circuit affirmed the decision. 12 5 The
appellate court found no Louisiana cases imposing liability on a
landowner under article 667 for the acts of its tenant and refused to
do so in this case.' 26 The appellate court also relied on Borenstein
and, under that reasoning, concluded that the tenant-operator of
the bar was actually responsible for the excessive noise; thus, there
was no basis in the law for holding the landowner liable under
article 667. 127
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
fourth circuit decision, determining that article 667, which sets
forth limitations imposed upon the ownership of the land, is
directly applicable to a landowner-lessor. 128 The court found that
the clear language of article 667 provides that if the landowner
knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know of any
damage incurred by a neighboring landowner, the owner may be
held liable. 129 The court explained that just because the landowner
utilizes his right as a property owner to lease his property, his
responsibilities and obligations set forth under article 667 as owner
120. Id. at 862.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 862-63.
123. Id. at 864.
124. Id. at 865-66.
125. Id. at 868.
126. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 960 So. 2d. 1283, 1285 (La. App.
4th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 859 (La. 2008).
127. Id.
128. Yokum, 977 So. 2d at 871, 875.
129. Id. at 874.
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of the land are not eradicated. 130 The court reasoned that, under the
court of appeal's rationale, even a landowner with full knowledge
of the potentially harmful effects of his tenant's activities on the
property would have little or no responsibility to protect
3 1 the public
and his neighbors from his tenant's harmful activities.1
A. Problems with the Yokum Decision
The Yokum court held that under article 667, a landowner can
be liable for the works or activities of his tenant if the owner
knows or should know that those activities will cause damage and
that the damage could be prevented through the exercise of
reasonable care. 132 This jurisprudential standard is overbroad
because it is inconsistent with the clear language of article 667, it
does not apply prior jurisprudential interpretations of that article,
and it fails to recognize important policy considerations.
1. InterpretingArticle 667
The Yokum court failed to apply the clear language of article
667. It is important to note that article 667 reads, "[The] proprietor
...is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew
or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his
,133 In Yokum, in order to
works would cause damage . .
determine that the landowner-proprietor could be liable for the
works of his tenant, the court changed the wording from his works
to "the 'works' on his property." 1 If the clear language of article
667 is used, 135 then the landowner's duty to exercise reasonable
care should only apply to his works, meaning the works or
activities that the owner has carried out upon the land, thus
excluding other works. The reasonable care standard should not
apply to any works on his land, or works of his tenant.
Furthermore, the Yokum court failed to follow the approach set
out in Borenstein, which requires that liability rest on the person
responsible for the existence of the condition that constitutes the
nuisance. 136 Along with Borenstein, several other Louisiana cases
involving fires have all held that article 667 should only be applied
130. Id. at 876.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 874.
133. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2008) (emphasis added).
134. Yokum, 977 So. 2d at 874 (emphasis added).
135. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2008).
136. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 806 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
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13 7
when the landowner himself is careless in his use of his land.
For example, in Terre Haute Plantation, Inc. v. Louisiana &
Arkansas Railway Co., plaintiffs sued a railroad for damages as3 8a
result of a fire that partially destroyed their sugarcane crop.'
Because it could find no evidence proving that the railroad
employees started the fire, the fourth circuit refused to hold the
railroad liable. 139 Instead, it held that article 667 applies "only
where the proprietor is carrying on some activity on his property
which causes damage to his neighbor."' 140 The court said that to
hold otherwise would cast liability on every landowner on whose
to neighboring lands, regardless
property a fire starts and spreads
14 1
of the actual cause of the fire.
The fourth circuit reaffirmed this point in Watson v. City of
New Orleans, a case in which neighbors sued a landowner for
damages caused by a fire originating in a wooden shed on the
landowner's premises. 142 The tenant's child accidentally started the
fire while playing with matches. 14 3 In refusing to hold the
landowner liable, the court said, "We are satisfied that under
Article 667 a neighboring landowner must prove more than the
mere fact that the fire originated on defendant's property. He must
show that it was the result of a use or activity conducted on the
property by the owner." 144 The court further noted, "We find no
support in the opinion to justify the imposition of liability on a
neighboring landowner where he does nothing but collect rent. A
be an unwarranted expansion of
contrary conclusion would
45
existing jurisprudence."1
Although these cases analyzed article 667 in the context of
fires and not nuisances, the interpretation used by the fourth circuit
is still persuasive because the issues presented are similar. Both
cases analyzed situations in which activities upon the land caused
harm to neighbors through the tenant's own fault and through no
fault of the landowner. Thus, this interpretation can and should be

137. Watson v. City of New Orleans, 593 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1992); Toussant v. Guice, 414 So. 2d
850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Terre Haute Plantation, Inc. v. La. & Ark. Ry. Co.,
210 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
138. 210 So. 2d at 567.
139. Id. at 568.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 593 So. 2d at 791.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 792.
145. Id.
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used in instances where courts use article 667 to determine the
liability of a landowner for the nuisance activities of his tenant.
2. Policy Problems
In Yokum, the Louisiana Supreme Court made the decision that
a landowner should not have immunity from liability for harm
caused by his tenant's works or activities. 146 The court was correct
in determining that a general immunity should not exist because
there are limited instances in which a landowner should bear
responsibility for the nuisance caused by his tenant. For example, a
general immunity might encourage landowners to engage in
business on their own properties under the names of separate
corporate entities and claim immunity for the conditions about
which they not only had knowlede, but which they encouraged
Additionally, if a general
and from which they profited.'
immunity existed, a landowner could ignore the same foreseeable
and preventable harm that is perpetuated through a series of
tenants, thus forcing neighbors to seek abatement of the same type
of abusive activities over and over again. 148 This Comment is not
arguing for a general immunity for landowners, but is instead
arguing that liability should be based on fault. Under the faultbased approach taken by the Borenstein court, landowners may be
held liable in the two situations presented above. In both of those
situations, the landowner knows or should know, before the lease
agreement is finalized, that the tenant will create the nuisance. At
that time, the landowner is in a position of power to avoid the
nuisance by refusing to rent the property or by instilling a clause in
the lease agreement preventing the tenant from participating in the
nuisance-creating activity. In failing to do so, the landowner is
partially responsible for the existence of the nuisance and is
therefore blameworthy under the fault-based analysis.
Unlike the examples presented above, in most cases, like in
Yokum, the tenant is a party unrelated to the landowner, and the
tenant has sole possession of the land during the term of the lease.
Because the landowner usually relinquishes control of the land
while the tenant maintains the ownership rights and
responsibilities, the landowner is not in the position to abate a
146. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859, 876 (La. 2008).
147. Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits on Behalf of French Quarter
Citizens, Inc. et al. at 2, Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859 (La.
2008) (No. 2007-C-1785).
148. Original Brief on the Merits on Behalf of Plaintiffs/Applicants, Peterson
M. Yokum and Polly Elizabeth Anderson at 15, Yokum, 977 So. 2d 859 (No.
2007-C-1785).
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nuisance that the tenant creates. 149 Furthermore, if a court
determines that the landowner should not be held liable, the
plaintiff is not without remedy. It is important to note that in
typical nuisance cases, the plaintiff seeks an injunction to stop the
harmful activity. The tenant is in a better position to abate the
nuisance when he is the party that creates it. Instead of suing the
landowner, the plaintiff can, and should, take legal action against
the tenant because the tenant is the party maintaining the
disturbance.
The holding of Yokum also failed to foresee its potentially
negative impacts on future landowner-tenant relationships. If the
landowner is to be held liable for the tortious behavior of his
tenant, sophisticated landowner-lessors will likely take more steps
to protect themselves. They may do this in several ways. In the
contractual terms of the lease, a landowner can prohibit activities
that are illegal or productive of nuisances. 150 Therefore, in a case
where a tenant creates a nuisance that is not necessarily unlawful,
the landowner would be in a better position to evict the tenant for
violating a term of the lease. This may sound simple enoug, but
A
eviction proceedings can be difficult and time-consuming.
landowner can also protect himself by requiring indemnity and
insurance from his tenants. 15 2 Additionally, a landowner can
maintain more control over the leased premises by placing a clause
in the lease agreement stating that the landowner has the right to
exercise control over the tenant's actions in regard to his use of the
land. Such a requirement, however, may require landowners to be
very invasive in exercising control over that tenant's behavior,
which is uncommon in contemporary landowner-tenant
relationships. This requirement could also backfire and put the
landowner in a lose-lose situation; while it allows the landowner to
maintain more control over his tenant's activities, it also puts more
liability on him in the event that his tenant does something harmful
to third persons. If the lease agreement has such a clause attached
to it, it may automatically make the landowner liable in tort for any
of the tenant's actions that prove harmful to third parties because
the owner had the authority to abate but failed to do so. All of
these suggested extra steps taken by the property owner, and the
149. See supra Part II.A.
150. Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits on Behalf of French Quarter
Citizens, Inc. et al., supra note 147, at 3.
151. See Marc A. Rapaport, A Summary of the Eviction Forms and
Procedures in Louisiana,LAW INFO., Sept. 5, 2007, http://1egalcatch.wordpress.
com/2007/09/05/a-summary-of-the-eviction-forms-and-procedures-in-louisiana/.
152. Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits on Behalf of French Quarter
Citizens, Inc. et al., supra note 147, at 3.
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additional tort liability, may increase the cost of lease agreements
and could skew the rental market in the state as compared to other
states. It may also force landowners to become invasive watchdogs
of their tenants' behavior. Perhaps these and other issues are not all
negative effects-some might argue that it is in the best interest of
injured plaintiffs to always have the option to sue the landownerbut they are effects nonetheless; Yokum, as it stands, has the
potential to significantly change the landowner-tenant relationship
in Louisiana.
B. How Future Courts Should Analyze the Issue
The fourth circuit in Borenstein held that the person
responsible for the existence of the nuisance should be the person
liable for the harm that the nuisance inflicts.153 This fault-based
approach to the problem is consistent with Louisiana tort law and
with the common law approach to landowner tort liability.
1. Learningfrom Louisiana Tort Law
Looking to the jurisprudential interpretations of Louisiana's
general negligence standard regarding tortious action, represented
by article 2315, gives insight into the proper interpretation of
article 667. First, the common law has determined that to cause a
nuisance is a tort 154 and that private nuisance liability should be a
matter of tort law.' 55 This interpretation has support in Louisiana
doctrine, jurisprudence, and the Civil Code. Professor Wex Malone
has consistently argued that article 667 imposes delictual
responsibility 5 6 and that its location in the part of the Civil Code
dealing with property institutions is "anomalous."' 57 He has also
argued that article 667 ought to be disregarded, or at least be given
a very limited interpretation, because the general law of torts can
more effectively take care of all matters of delictual
responsibility. 158 Additionally, prior to the 1996 legislative tort
153. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 806 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
154. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 7.2.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 15, § 822 cmt. b.
156. See Wex Malone, Torts, The Works of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1965-1970 Term, 26 LA. L. REv. 510 (1966); Wex Malone, The Works
of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1946-1947 Term, 8 LA. L. REv. 237,
248 (1948).
157. Wex Malone, Torts, The Works of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1969-1970 Term, 31 LA. L. REV. 231 (1971).
158. Yiannopoulos, supranote 48, at 208.
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revision, Louisiana courts used article 667 by analogy in cases to
find a violation of article 2315.!"9 The revision of article 667 in the
1996 legislative session was itself part of a "tort reform," and the
article's new language has brought article 667 even more in line
with traditional language of delictual obligations.'
Therefore,
because the amendment eliminated the strict liability of
landowners and replaced it with a negligence standard, a traditional
negligence analysis is now proper when determining liability for
nuisances.
Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. 16 There are four general requirements to prove
negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.' 62 The plaintiff
must establish that the defendant owes him a duty to exercise
reasonable care and that the defendant breached that duty.' 63 The
plaintiff also must prove that the plaintiff suffered damages and
that there was a causal relationship between the defendant's action
or inaction and the plaintiff's damages. 164 Under this approach, in a
landowner-tenant situation such as that presented in Yokum, the
first requirement is always met because, under article 667, a
landowner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care toward his
neighbors. Thus, in Yokum, the landowner owed a duty of
reasonable care to his neighbors even though he executed a lease
of his land. 165 The second requirement of breach determines
whether the defendant acted reasonably. 66 This is where it is again
important to point out that the plain language of article 667 states
that "[the] proprietor... is answerable for damages only upon a
showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known that his works would cause damage. .. "'67 Reading
the clear language of article 667,168 the landowner's duty to
exercise reasonable care should only apply to his works; he should
not owe a duty of reasonable care regarding the works of his tenant
because it is not an element of the landowner's obligation to his
neighbor. This approach is also consistent with the typical
approach to torts in Louisiana, which requires that "every act that

159. See supra Part II.B. 1.

160. See supra Part II.B.1.
161. MARAIST& GALLIGAN, supra note 94, § 3.01.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859, 876 (La. 2008).
166. MARAIST& GALLIGAN, supra note 94, § 3.03.
167. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2008) (emphasis added).

168. See id.
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to another obliges him by whose fault it happened
causes damalze
''
to repair it. n
In cases where the landowner did not create the nuisance
himself, proving the causal relationship between the landowner's
action (or inaction) and the plaintiff's damages is also challenging.
In Louisiana, as well as most other jurisdictions, cause is divided
into two categories: cause-in-fact and legal cause.1 70 The first
element questions whether the defendant's negligent act was a
cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's damages; that is, whether the
defendant's action had a proximate relation to the harm that
7
occurred, and whether that relation was substantial in character.'1
In cases such as Yokum, it may be possible for a fact-finder to
determine that the landowner's inaction in abating the nuisance
may have been a cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
However, the second part of the causation analysis asks, as a
matter of policy and fairness, "does society want to allow this
plaintiff to recover from this defendant for these particular
damages arising in this particular manner?' 72 In Yokum the
question must be asked, does society want to allow a neighbor to
recover damages from an absent landowner when the tenant is
responsible for the harmful nuisance? The 1996 legislative revision
eliminated strict liability of landowners under article 667 (except
for pile driving and blasting with explosives), and the article now
requires a landowner to be negligent in his use of the land in order
to be liable.' 73 There is also no Louisiana jurisprudence that
supports the idea that a landowner should be vicariously liable for
the acts of its tenants.' 74 Therefore, in most cases, it is likely unfair
to place liability upon a landowner who had no connection to the
activities carried on by his tenant that caused a nuisance. In such a
case, clearly, the tenant is the proximate cause of the disturbance
169.
170.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2008) (emphasis added).
MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 94, § 3.04; see also Barasich v.

Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 689-90 (E.D. La. 2006)
(citing Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374, 378 (La. 1988)).
171. Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905,
913 (La. 1973) (citing Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Miss. Tank Co., 166 So. 2d 252,
255 (La. 1964)); MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 94, § 3.04.
172. MARAIST& GALLIGAN, supra note 94, § 3.04.
173. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2008); Maraist & Galligan, supra note 5, at
364.
174. See Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 912 ("[T]he proprietor is likewise
responsible not only for his own activity, but also for that carried on by his
agents, contractors and representatives with his consent and permission. This
liability which the law imposes attaches also to the agent or contractor, who, as
in this case, becomes solidarily liable with the proprietor if his activity causes
damage to a neighbor."). Note that tenant is not listed.
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because he created it; thus, the Borenstein approach requires that
he be liable, and this approach is consistent with Louisiana tort
law.
2. Learningfrom the Common Law
Louisiana's civilian tradition creates a unique method for
analyzing the liability in landowner-tenant relations, and it is
important to look to the Civil Code articles to determine the
solution to problems. The approach taken by common law
jurisdictions is in no way binding on Louisiana courts;
nevertheless, the common law remains a useful resource to
Louisiana courts by exemplifying solutions to problems faced in
other states similar to those faced in Louisiana. It is especially
relevant to look at the approach taken by other jurisdictions when
Louisiana courts are faced with new issues, such as the issue
presented in Yokum, which is whether a landowner may be liable
for the nuisance-creating activity of his tenant.75
The common law approach treats nuisances as a to176 and
determines that under most circumstances, a landowner has no
control over the conduct of the tenant or the persons upon the
leased land while the tenant is in possession. Therefore, the
landowner is not ordinarily responsible for the tortious acts of the
tenant or third persons. 7rExamples of this methodology can be
seen in states nationwide. In a Connecticut case, a tenant's dog
escaped and attacked a woman as she walked along a public
sidewalk near the tenant's apartment. 178 The appellate court held
that the landowner owed no duty to the woman to prevent a
nuisance because the tenant did not own a dog when the lease
began, and at no time did the tenant seek the landowner's
permission to maintain a dog in the apartment. 17 9 Thus, because the
woman failed to prove the landowner's knowledge of the existence
of a dangerous activity at the inception of the lease, the court
appellate
court came
recentslipped
Illinoison
to hold
him liable.
refused
on
loose carpeting
when A
a guest
to a similar
conclusion

175. The author could find no cases from common law jurisdictions with fact
patterns particularly similar to the Yokum case. Nevertheless, the cases presented
are representative of how the common law would likely approach such a fact
pattern.
176. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, § 7.2.
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. Stokes v. Lyddy, 815 A.2d 263, 266 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
179. Id. at 255.
180. Id. at 264.
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the stairs of a leased premise.' 8' The court held that the landowner
conditions in the
was not liable for injuries caused by defective
182
control.
tenant's
the
under
were
that
premises
Restatement (Second) of Torts (the "Restatement") section 837
states an exception to this general rule of no liability. A landowner
can be subject to liability for nuisance-creating activity carried on
by tenants if, at the time of the lease, he knows that that activity
will be carried on and that the activity involved will necessarily
cause a nuisance.' 8 3 The recent Iowa Supreme Court decision of
Tetzlaff v. Camp exemplifies this exception.' 84 In that case, a
tenant farmed a portion of the owner's land and routinely applied
manure from a hog finishing facility on the property.' 8 5 Neighbors
complained to the landowner about the manure spreading and later
filed suit against both the landowner and the tenant, alleging
nuisance. 186 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the landowner, finding that the owner did not substantially
control or participate in the nuisance activity.' 8 7 The Iowa Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the landowner's unique level of
involvement with both the tenant and the complaining homeowner
generated enough factual issues so that summary judgment was not
appropriate. 188 The court took into account the facts that the
landowner knew of the tenant's manure-spreading activities and
the neighbors' corresponding complaints before the lease
started.' The landowner continued to renew the tenant's lease
(and thereby endorsed the tenant's manure-s Preading procedures)
despite the neighbors' repeated complaints.19' The court held that,
at the expiration of a lease, if a landowner knows that a nuisance
exists, he then has the ability to stop it by refusing renewal of the
lease or by adding restrictive terms in the lease agreement. 19 ' If he
fails to do so and renews the192lease, then he may be liable for the
continuance of the nuisance.
181. Gilley v. Kiddel, 865 N.E.2d 262 (Il. App. Ct. 2007).
182. Id. at 266; accord Humphrey v. Byron, 850 N.E.2d 1044 (Mass. 2006);
Avron v. Plummer, 132 N.W.2d 198 (N.D. 1964); Coward v. Fleming, 102
N.E.2d 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Hoyle v. Glenn E. Breeding Co., 555 P.2d
1278 (Okla. 1976).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 15, § 837.
184. 715 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 2006).
185. Id. at257.
186. Id.at 257-58.
187. Id. at 258.
188. Id. at 263.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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If the Restatement view is applied to the Yokum case, the
landowner would not be held liable for the acts of his tenants
unless he knew or should have known, at the time the lease was
signed, that the tenant's loud music would cause a nuisance to the
neighbors. This exception is appropriate because, prior to signing
the lease agreement, the landowner is in a position to do something
about the nuisance-creating activity, such as refusing to enter into
the lease or instilling a clause in the agreement preventing the
nuisance-creating activity (as opposed to after the lease is signed
when the landowner has less authority over the tenant or power to
abate his lawful actions). Although the landowner in Yokum likely
knew or should have known that the tenant would operate a bar
that played music, it is not likely that he knew or should have
known the music would cause a nuisance. Bourbon Street is
internationally renowned as a loud and wild hotspot. Neighbors to
Bourbon Street establishments should be fully aware of the
tendency for there to be bars on that street that play loud music.
Using the Borenstein fault-based approach, Louisiana courts
would likely come to the same conclusion as that based upon the
Restatement approach. Borenstein calls for liability to be placed on
the person(s) responsible for the existence of the condition.' 93 If the
landowner has knowledge prior to signing the lease agreement that
the tenant will create a nuisance and does nothing to prevent it, then
the landowner is partially responsible for its existence. Therefore, it
would be fair to hold the landowner liable for the damage caused to
neighbors by the nuisance. If Louisiana courts use this approach in
future nuisance cases, there will be no absolute immunity for
landowners. The same foreseeable and preventable harm will not be
perpetrated through a series of tenants without liability resting on
the landowner if courts used the Borenstein fault-based approach. In
that circumstance, the landowner will have knowledge of the
nuisance-creating activity between leasing agreements, at a time
when he has the power to abate it, thereby making him partially
responsible for the existence of the condition. Thus, the Borenstein
approach would achieve results consistent with those achieved under
the common law approach.
IV. CONCLUSION

Imagine that it is three o'clock on a Sunday morning when
Mike gets a phone call from one of his old neighbors, Al. Al
complains that Mike's tenants, three college-aged boys renting
193. Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 806 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
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Mike's old house, are having a wild party. Mike calls his old house
and asks his tenants to settle down. A week later, Mike gets a
similar phone call. This time, Al says that Mike's tenants have
continued to play loud music and have people over late into the
night, and they have begun to throw beer cups over Al's fence into
his yard. Mike is awoken again two weeks later by Al claiming
that the tenants have broken his fence. Al demands compensation
from Mike, and he insists that Mike control his tenants. Mike asks
Al not to call his house again. He tells Al to handle the situation
himself and that he should call the police on the tenants if need be.
Al gets angry and says that he has had enough. He says he plans to
sue Mike over this controversy.
Should Al sue Mike? Would a court find Mike liable for the
nuisance activities of his tenants and the damage they have done?
Under the Yokum analysis, the answer is quite possibly "yes." The
Louisiana Supreme Court in Yokum held that, under article 667, a
landowner may be liable for the acts of his tenant if he knew or,1 in
94
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about them.
Arguably, after the first phone call, Mike knew of the risk that his
tenants' behavior would be a nuisance to Al. However, in applying
the Yokum standard to future cases, such as the one between Al and
Mike, Louisiana courts should be wary of imposing liability on
landowners for the tortious acts of tenants. The Yokum standard is
overbroad because it is not in line with the actual language of
article 667,195 nor is it consistent with prior jurisprudence
interpreting article 667196 or the approach taken by common law
19 7
The Yokum decision also neglected to address the
courts.
significant impact it could have on the future of the landownertenant relationship in Louisiana. For example, if Mike had known
that he could be liable for the acts of his college-aged tenants, he
might have demanded higher rental payments or a larger deposit.
Perhaps he would have taken out additional insurance, or he may
have been more discriminatory in choosing a worthy tenant.
Clearly, knowledge of such additional liability risk has the
potential to raise the lease rates in Louisiana.
The Yokum court also neglected to address the significant
overlap between the use of article 667 and article 2315 in
Louisiana jurisprudence. Because these two articles have been
194. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859, 874 (La. 2008).
195. See supraPart III.A.1.
196. See Watson v. City of New Orleans, 593 So. 2d 790, 791 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992); Borenstein, 255 So. 2d at 806; Terre Haute Plantation, Inc. v. La. &
Ark. Ry. Co., 210 So. 2d 566, 568 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
197. See supra Part III.B.2.
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used in combination, and because article 667 has been amended to
include a negligence standard, article 667 should have a similar
interpretation as that of article 2315. Under this fault-based
analysis, the landowner should only be liable for the nuisance if he
is at least in part responsible for the creation or maintenance of the
condition. Mike and landlords in similar positions should not bear
liability for the tortious activities of their tenants when they have
no involvement with those activities. Thus, the ultimate question
that must be answered is, was Mike the actor responsible for the
harm done to Al, and is it fair to hold him liable?
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